Electric Cars Are Winning. The Hard Part Starts Now.
A
research-backed longread on batteries, charging, China, software, the grid —
and what the next decade of electric mobility could actually look like.
| Electric vehicles are becoming part of a much larger energy system — connecting batteries, charging infrastructure, cities and the power grid. |
For most of the electric-car era, the debate began with the same
question: will people actually buy them? By 2026, that question feels
increasingly outdated.
More than 20 million electric cars were sold worldwide in 2025.
Using the International Energy Agency’s definition — battery-electric vehicles
plus plug-in hybrids — that works out to roughly one in every four new cars
sold globally. About 65% of those sales were fully battery-electric. In China,
the transition moved even faster: electric cars passed half of all new-car
sales for the first time.
None of this means the transition is finished. EVs are still too
expensive in some markets. Charging access depends heavily on where and how you
live. Battery supply chains are concentrated in a handful of countries, and
policy can swing faster than factories can be built. But the problem has
changed. Automakers no longer need to prove that an electric car can work. They
need to make one that is affordable, easy to charge, profitable to build and
uncomplicated to own.
The breakthroughs that matter most over the next decade may be less
cinematic than the old dream of a 1,000-kilometre battery. A cheaper chemistry,
a flatter fast-charging curve, better thermal management, reliable recycling or
a car that can support a home during a blackout could matter more than another
headline range record.
The next phase of the EV story is not about finding one miracle technology. It is about making the whole system work.
The EV transition is real. It is also wildly uneven
Global averages blur very different realities. In China, electric
cars are already a normal part of the mass market. Europe is moving more
slowly, but the direction is clear: battery-electric cars reached about 19% of
new registrations in 2025, while overall electric-car sales recovered strongly
after a flat 2024. Across many emerging markets, the shift is only beginning,
often pulled forward by cheaper Chinese models and imports.
The United States is a different case again. Home charging is easier
for many suburban drivers, but EV adoption is more politically contested, model
availability is different, and public fast-charging coverage remains thinner
relative to the vehicle fleet than in China or Europe.
There is no single global 'EV experience'. A driver with a garage,
cheap overnight electricity and a 400-kilometre-range car may barely think
about charging. Someone in an apartment who depends on expensive public fast
chargers can face a completely different cost equation. The car may be similar;
the infrastructure around it changes everything.
The next stage of electrification will therefore be shaped as much
by apartment parking, grid connections, housing rules and manufacturing
economics as by battery chemistry.
| Global electric-car sales climbed from about 3.1 million in 2020 to roughly 20 million in 2025, making EVs around one quarter of new cars sold worldwide. |
Range is no longer the whole story
For years, EV progress was measured almost entirely in kilometres.
Bigger battery, longer range, less anxiety: that was the sales pitch.
That race is beginning to slow. The IEA puts the sales-weighted
average range of battery-electric cars at roughly 380 kilometres, and the
global figure has started to plateau. Battery technology has not stopped
improving. What has changed is the optimization target: manufacturers are
increasingly trading some headline range for lower cost, faster charging and
better efficiency.
A larger battery is not free range. It adds weight, cost and
material demand, and much of that capacity may sit unused on ordinary days.
Once a car can comfortably handle commuting and common intercity trips, another
100 kilometres may be less useful than a lower purchase price or the ability to
add 200 kilometres during a short stop.
The more useful question is shifting from 'How far can it go?' to
'How quickly, cheaply and reliably can it keep going?'
The next EV race is shifting from maximum
battery size to usable range, charging speed, efficiency and cost.
There will not be one battery winner
'Lithium-ion' sounds like a single technology. In practice, it is a
family of chemistries with very different compromises in cost, energy density,
safety, cold-weather behaviour and material demand.
The market is not converging on a single 'best battery'. It is
splitting into batteries designed for different jobs.
Nickel-rich chemistries such as NMC still make sense when high
energy density matters. They can pack more energy into a given mass, which is
valuable in long-range and premium vehicles. But they are relatively expensive
and rely on materials such as nickel and cobalt.
Lithium iron phosphate, or LFP, has changed the economics of
mass-market EVs. LFP uses no nickel or cobalt, is generally durable and
thermally stable, and has become increasingly competitive in energy density.
Its rise is one reason cobalt demand expectations have moderated. For a
commuter car that does not need extreme range, LFP can be a better engineering
answer than a more exotic high-energy battery.
Sodium-ion offers a different compromise. Sodium is abundant, and
leading cells can perform unusually well in deep cold; the IEA notes designs
retaining around 90% of nominal capacity at roughly -40°C. The penalty is
energy density. For now, sodium-ion makes more sense in smaller vehicles,
short-range fleets, cold climates and stationary storage than in premium
long-range SUVs.
Solid-state batteries still attract the biggest headlines. Replacing
a liquid electrolyte with a solid one could improve safety and open a path to
higher energy density. The underlying science is credible; industrialization is
the hard part. Interfaces between solid materials must survive thousands of
cycles, and defects that look manageable in a laboratory become expensive when
a factory has to make millions of cells at high yield.
So solid-state deserves to be taken seriously — but not treated as
an imminent universal replacement for today's lithium-ion batteries. In 2026, a
prototype is the easy headline. The harder milestone is repeatable
automotive-scale production at an acceptable cost, with predictable lifetime
and safety.
Battery chemistries: what
they are actually good at
|
Chemistry |
Main strength |
Main weakness |
Best fit |
2026 reality |
|
LFP |
Lower cost, durability, safety |
Lower energy density than top NMC |
Mass-market EVs, fleets |
Mainstream and growing |
|
NMC / nickel-rich |
High energy density |
Cost and mineral exposure |
Long-range / premium EVs |
Mainstream |
|
Sodium-ion |
Low-temperature performance, abundant sodium |
Lower energy density |
Smaller cars, fleets, storage |
Early scale-up |
|
Solid-state |
Potential safety and energy-density gains |
Manufacturing yield, cost, durability |
Future premium / long-range applications |
Prototype / pilot stage |
The less glamorous breakthrough: cheaper batteries
The biggest battery story may be the least glamorous one: cost.
Average battery prices fell again in 2025, according to the IEA, extending a
decade-long decline. Scale, simpler pack design, chemistry shifts and fierce
competition have done at least as much for EV economics as laboratory
breakthroughs.
This is one reason the affordable-EV story is increasingly being
written in China. The country combines enormous vehicle demand with a dense
battery supply chain and fierce competition among manufacturers. The result is
a market where some battery-electric cars already cost less to buy than
comparable combustion vehicles — a situation that is still unusual in the
United States and parts of Europe.
For a mass-market car, the 'best' battery is not the cell with the
highest energy density. It is the one that delivers enough range, life and
charging performance at the lowest total cost.
Charging is becoming a grid problem
By the end of 2025, the world had more than 7 million public
charging points, up by more than a third in one year. Private charging was much
larger still: the IEA estimates more than 43 million private light-duty
charging points globally.
Seven million public chargers sounds like the end of range anxiety.
It is not. It simply means the bottleneck has moved.
Drivers who can charge at home usually do, because it is cheap and
almost invisible: plug in at night, leave in the morning. The difficult cases
are apartment residents, street parkers, high-mileage drivers and regions where
distribution grids or permitting cannot keep up.
Public charging also has an economic trap. Fast charging is
convenient, but it can cost far more per kilowatt-hour than residential
electricity. In some markets, a driver who relies almost entirely on expensive
public fast charging can lose much of the running-cost advantage of an EV.
The second change is speed. Ultra-fast networks are expanding
quickly, and charging systems above 250 kW are becoming more common. But a
charger can only deliver what the car can accept. In 2025, only a minority of
BEV models could make full use of very high-power charging, and battery
temperature, state of charge and pack architecture still matter enormously.
That is why the headline number on a charger can be misleading. What
matters is the charging curve — how much power the battery can accept across
the whole stop. A car that touches 350 kW for a moment and then falls away may
save little time over one that holds 220 kW for longer.
The best charging experience will eventually be the one nobody talks
about: plug in, stretch your legs, come back ten or fifteen minutes later and
have enough range for the next leg.
| EV charging is becoming an ecosystem rather than a single type of station — from overnight home charging and urban curbside points to high-power hubs built for long-distance travel. |
China changed the economics of the EV
Any serious discussion of EVs in 2026 has to start with an
uncomfortable fact for the traditional auto industry: China is not merely the
largest market. It is the centre of gravity of the global EV supply chain.
Nearly three-quarters of the world’s electric cars were produced in
China in 2025. China also accounted for more than 80% of battery-cell
production and even larger shares of key battery materials. Chinese
manufacturers exported more than 2.5 million electric cars in 2025, twice the
previous year’s level.
That scale creates a feedback loop. Large domestic demand supports
huge factories. Huge factories drive costs down. Lower costs enable more models
and sharper price competition. Competition forces faster product cycles, which
creates more demand and more manufacturing experience.
For Europe, the United States, Japan and Korea, the strategic
question is therefore no longer whether they can build good EVs. They can. The
question is whether they can build complete supply chains — batteries, power
electronics, software, minerals processing and manufacturing — at a cost that
can compete with a system China has spent years scaling.
Tariffs can slow imports. They cannot, by themselves, build a
competitive battery industry, software stack or supplier network.
EVs are not zero-impact. They are still usually cleaner
Electric cars are not environmentally weightless. Mining and
refining consume energy. Battery production adds emissions before the first
kilometre is driven. A large electric SUV still uses more material and road
space than a small car, and an EV charged on a coal-heavy grid has a larger
footprint than one running on low-carbon electricity.
The comparison only makes sense across the full lifecycle. A petrol
car also carries an upstream footprint — oil extraction, refining and transport
— and then continues burning fuel for every kilometre it travels.
A 2025 International Council on Clean Transportation analysis for
the European Union estimated that a medium battery-electric car sold in 2025
produces roughly 73% less greenhouse-gas emissions over its lifecycle than an
equivalent gasoline car using the expected EU electricity mix. The
battery-electric car starts with higher production emissions, but the study
estimated that this additional manufacturing footprint is offset after roughly
17,000 kilometres of driving.
Those figures are not universal; vehicle size, battery size,
electricity mix, lifetime mileage and manufacturing assumptions all matter. But
they capture the central difference. An EV begins with a manufacturing penalty
and can then benefit as the electricity system gets cleaner. A combustion
engine keeps burning fuel throughout its life.
Recycling is essential — but its biggest payoff comes later
Battery recycling is often presented as the answer to mineral
scarcity. In the long run, it could become one of the most important parts of
the EV economy. In the short run, there is a simple constraint: most of the
batteries worth recycling are still driving around inside cars.
The global lithium-ion battery market expanded so quickly after 2020
that there simply are not yet enough end-of-life EV packs to feed recycling
plants at the scale future supply chains will need. Production scrap is
therefore an important source of recyclable material today.
As the first massive generation of EVs ages, that changes. Lithium,
nickel, cobalt and copper do not disappear when a battery reaches the end of
its automotive life. Recovering them can reduce the need for new mining, reduce
import dependence and create a strategic stock of materials inside markets that
do not have large mineral resources of their own.
The complication is geography. Recycling capacity is itself
concentrated. The IEA estimates that China currently holds more than
three-quarters of global battery pre-treatment capacity and around 90% of
material-recovery capacity. So recycling can strengthen resource security only
if collection, transport and processing capacity scale in more regions as well.
Your next EV may behave more like a software platform
An electric drivetrain is mechanically simpler than a combustion
engine. The car around it is becoming much more digitally complex.
EV manufacturers helped normalize a new idea: the car is not
finished when it leaves the factory. Software can change energy management,
charging behaviour, navigation, driver-assistance features, infotainment and
even some performance characteristics after delivery.
The IEA now describes this transition in terms of the
software-defined vehicle: a car whose functions are increasingly controlled by
software running on centralized computing architectures rather than dozens of
isolated electronic modules.
That matters for energy. A smarter battery-management system can
estimate cell health, precondition the pack before fast charging, choose when
to charge based on electricity prices and protect the battery from unnecessary
degradation. It matters for maintenance because anomalies can be detected
before a dashboard warning appears. And it matters for business because
manufacturers can sell features and subscriptions long after the car leaves the
showroom.
The trade-off is familiar from smartphones: more software brings
more cybersecurity risk, greater dependence on long-term updates and awkward
questions about whether a feature in a car you own should remain locked behind
a subscription.
Related Next Horizon reading: Tesla in 2026: History, Electric Cars, AI, Robotaxis and
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• Autonomous Vehicles: How Self-Driving Cars Work,
Robotaxis, Safety and the Road to Level 5
A parked EV could become part of the power system
Most cars spend most of their lives parked. In an EV, that leaves a
large battery sitting idle for hours at a time.
Bidirectional charging changes the relationship. A compatible
vehicle can draw electricity when it is cheap or abundant and send some of it
back to a house, building or grid later. Vehicle-to-home systems can already
act as backup power during an outage. Vehicle-to-grid systems could eventually
help utilities absorb solar power in the afternoon and return some energy
during evening demand peaks.
The concept is simple; deploying it at scale is not. Bidirectional
hardware costs money. Utilities need standards, tariffs and cybersecurity
rules. Drivers need confidence that helping the grid will not leave them short
of charge or accelerate battery wear.
The U.S. Department of Energy now treats vehicle-grid integration as
a decade-scale infrastructure challenge rather than a gadget feature. That is
the right framing. Millions of EVs arriving home at 6 p.m. and charging
immediately can stress local networks. Millions of EVs charging intelligently —
or occasionally supplying power — can become part of the solution.
The bottlenecks are no longer mysterious
The obstacles to mass adoption are no longer mysterious. Most are
mundane, expensive and stubborn.
Affordability remains uneven. In China, intense competition has
pushed many EVs toward or below purchase-price parity with combustion cars. In
other markets, an EV can still carry a large upfront premium even if
electricity makes it cheaper to run.
Charging remains unequal. A homeowner with a driveway can wake up to
a full battery every morning. A renter in a dense city may depend on a public
network that is slower and more expensive. The EV transition will therefore be
partly a housing and infrastructure transition.
Supply chains remain concentrated. Lithium gets most of the
headlines, but graphite, cathode materials, refining capacity and manufacturing
know-how can be just as strategic. The IEA expects lithium demand to more than
triple by 2040 under stated policies, while demand for nickel, graphite and
rare earths also rises strongly.
Vehicle size is another awkward part of the story. Electrifying a
very large SUV removes tailpipe emissions, but it still requires a larger
battery, more material and more road space. Cleaner cars do not automatically
create an efficient transport system.
And policy uncertainty matters. EV factories, battery plants, mines
and charging networks require investments that pay back over many years. If
governments repeatedly change incentives, standards or trade rules, companies
face a moving target — and consumers do too.
What the next decade may actually look like
2026–2028: economics beats spectacle
Near-term progress will look incremental rather than futuristic:
more affordable LFP-based cars, wider use of 800- and 1000-volt architectures,
better battery preconditioning, denser fast-charging corridors and more
vehicles designed around centralized computing from the start.
Sodium-ion will begin to matter in selected segments, especially
where cold-weather performance or low cost matters more than maximum range.
Solid-state batteries will continue moving through pilots and limited
production, but should not be expected to replace conventional lithium-ion
across the market overnight.
The visible market battle will be global: Chinese manufacturers
expanding abroad, European and Korean brands defending established markets, and
U.S. automakers trying to scale EV platforms while keeping costs under control.
Early 2030s: charging fades into the background
By the early 2030s, success may look like drivers thinking about
charging less. More buildings will be wired for overnight charging. Highway
hubs will deliver far more power. Route planners will predict — and perhaps
reserve — charging stops automatically. Fleets will increasingly charge when
electricity is cheap and back off when local grids are stressed.
The battery market will become more segmented. Cheap urban EVs may
use chemistry optimized for cost. Long-range vehicles may use higher-energy
packs. Trucks may prioritize charging power and cycle life. Some premium
vehicles may finally use solid-state cells if manufacturers prove them at
scale.
The EV will also become more tightly connected to the electricity
system. Bidirectional charging will not be universal, but homes, fleets and
commercial buildings will increasingly use parked vehicles as controllable
energy storage.
Mid-2030s: the electric car stops feeling special
If current trends hold, one of the biggest changes by the mid-2030s
may be linguistic. 'Electric car' could begin to sound as redundant as
'internet phone'. The drivetrain would simply be part of the product
architecture rather than the product's identity.
Competition will move toward efficiency, software, charging
experience, durability, driver assistance, cabin design and total cost. The
strongest companies may not be those with the most futuristic battery
announcement, but those that make ownership boringly reliable.
That is also why the electric transition is bigger than replacing an
engine with a motor. It connects cars to power grids, battery factories,
software platforms, mineral supply chains, recycling systems and increasingly
autonomous mobility services.
The second EV revolution
The EV debate is still often staged as a fight between believers and
skeptics: electric cars will replace everything, or the whole transition is
overhyped. The market is already more complicated — and more interesting — than
either slogan.
Electric vehicles have already crossed the threshold from experiment
to global industry. More than 20 million were sold in a single year. Battery
prices have fallen dramatically. Charging networks are expanding. China has
created a manufacturing machine that is forcing the rest of the world to
rethink the economics of car production.
The next phase is harder precisely because it is less glamorous. It
needs apartment charging, transformer upgrades, genuinely affordable small
cars, recycling plants, grid software, resilient supply chains and vehicles
that remain useful for fifteen years instead of merely looking impressive at
launch.
There will still be breakthrough batteries, and some will matter
enormously. Others will spend years in headlines before they reach ordinary
roads. The technologies that transform transport most may be the ones drivers
barely notice: a cheaper pack, a charger that works every time, software that
squeezes more distance from the same energy, or a parked car quietly keeping a
house powered during an outage.
The first EV revolution proved that an electric car could be
desirable. The second has a harder goal: make electric mobility unremarkable.
FAQ
Are electric cars really cleaner than gasoline cars?
In most regions, yes over the full vehicle lifecycle, although the
size of the advantage depends on the electricity mix, battery size,
manufacturing and lifetime mileage. A 2025 ICCT analysis estimated that medium
BEVs sold in the EU produce about 73% less lifecycle greenhouse-gas emissions
than comparable gasoline cars.
Are solid-state batteries about to replace lithium-ion batteries?
Not yet. Solid-state batteries are scientifically promising, but
automotive-scale manufacturing, durability, cost and quality control still need
to be proven. They are more likely to enter selected high-value applications
before becoming a mass-market default.
Will EV charging ever be as fast as refuelling a gasoline car?
For some vehicles and charging systems, practical stops are already
moving toward the 10–15 minute range for substantial added range. But real
charging time depends on the car’s charging curve, battery temperature, charger
power and starting state of charge.
Will sodium-ion batteries replace lithium?
Probably not across the whole market. Their lower energy density
makes them less suitable for long-range vehicles, but their cold-weather
performance and material advantages could make them useful in smaller cars,
fleets, mixed-chemistry packs and stationary storage.
Can electric cars power homes or the grid?
Some already can. Bidirectional charging allows compatible EVs to
provide backup power to a home or building, and vehicle-to-grid systems can
potentially provide grid services. Wider adoption depends on compatible
hardware, standards, utility programs and economics.